A Sociolinguistic Analysis of the Language of Reykjavik Negotiation

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Abstract

This paper investigates the language of negotiation of the Reykjavik summit (held in Iceland on October 11-12, 1986 between Americans and Russians). The central argument was that diplomatic negotiation does not emerge from a vacuum. There are always crucial elements, linguistic and non-linguistic which precede any negotiating event. These elements which have been termed 'the Preparatory-Essential Context' of negotiation, can have a significant negative influence on the following actual negotiation if they are mismanaged and misconducted.

The analysis of the Pre-essential context of the Reykjavik Summit negotiation demonstrated unsuccessful communication; the mutual misinterpretation and miscalculation of each partner's messages and intended acts intensified the social and cultural differences between the two partners and generated a great deal of misunderstanding. This resulted in the actual negotiation activity and led to mutual accusations between the two partners; each accused the other of having no willingness to reach an agreement. This outcome disappointed both partners and eventually the collapse of the summit's negotiation.

In order to avoid such an undesirable outcome, this research proposed a four-principled strategy to ensure a peaceful and successful negotiation. The principles include the principle of formula, the principle of straightforwardness, the principle of trust and accountability and the principle of compromise.
1. Introduction

This paper analyses the language of diplomatic negotiation of the Reykjavik Summit (held in Iceland on 11-12 October, 1986 between the United States and the former Soviet Union).

The aim of this investigation is to present a specimen of diplomatic communication which exists in the current practice of negotiation; what kind of results it produces, and why such results happen. This means that the only aim of attempting to investigate the Reykjavik Summit’s negotiation is to learn the extent to which Language, Culture and Communication (or negotiation) interrelate (see Al Mulla, 1986: 10; 1991: 18; Valdes, 1986: 1), and the extent to which this relationship affects the process of negotiation, and what kind of outcome it produces.

1.1. One essential element in communication through negotiation is the ‘intention’ of achieving certain purposes (Al Mulla, 1988: 25; 199: 39; Wright, 1975: 375). Therefore, with special reference to the Reykjavik Summit, the former American President, Ronald Reagan, and the former Soviet Union President, Mikhail Gorbachev, presumably approached Reykjavik with something in their minds (i.e. certain mental or intentional states). It is the general belief of most observers, according to the diplomats who were interviewed, that the two respected leaders went, in the first place, to Iceland in order to reach a certain agreement on reducing the arms race between the two countries, if not the elimination of nuclear weapons altogether. Such an agreement, I would argue, was desirable to both leaders. It was, and has been understood among career diplomats (e.g. ambassadors) that no two leaders meet to negotiate issues in details; when they meet, they do so to agree on something, whatever that thing might be. However, what ultimately happened at the Reykjavik Summit, between the two leaders, was something totally unexpected.

1.2. It is perfectly understood that, in addition to the different political stances according to their visions of the world at large, the two partners of the negotiation (the Americans and the Russians) had a diversity of national interests and values as well as the roles they were supposed to play at that particular meeting. These matters, in themselves, could do a great deal in complicating the negotiation process, decreasing the chances of reaching a certain outcome, or hindering the progress of the activities. However, these differences did not stem from a vacuum. Indeed, they did have roots in the two
partners included in culture. Different cultures mean different ways of thinking, different approaches of looking at things and different behavioral patterns in dealing with certain issues (see Glen, 1959: 13; Hymes, 1974: 33; Osterloh, 1986: 77). In negotiation, these matters could prevent or deteriorate an agreement. If one party to the negotiation was not aware of the role and function of these differences, then miscommunication, or even breakdown of the negotiation, could be the result.

1.3. Diplomatic communication or negotiation is full of indirect speech acts (e.g. request, demand, apology, advice, promise, etc.), which go side-by-side with the intentional states of the negotiators who perform the propositional contents of the messages which they try to communicate to their counterparts. These intentional states (e.g. expectations, beliefs, desires intentions) control and monitor the indirect speech acts (the illocutionary force of the message). In such a context, if the counterpart did not recognize the indirect speech act of the partner and did not act in accordance with that act (the request, demands or the promise) then the intentional states of the partner would be unsatisfied and the activity of the negotiation would be subject to risk since the conditions of satisfaction (or the sincerity conditions) have not been met (see Searle, 1983: 10). Therefore, if the two parties of the negotiation were unaware of, or if they ignored, the indirect speech acts of each other, then a failure to produce appropriate results would be likely to follow.

1.4. Diplomatic communication or negotiation does not emerge from a vacuum. There are almost always crucial elements which precede the actual negotiation event. These elements, which I have already termed 'the Preparatory-Essential Context' or the 'Pre-Essential Context' of negotiation (Al Mulla, 1988: 98), can be linguistic as well as extra-linguistic (or non-linguistic). The linguistic elements may take different configurations such as floating well-intended messages or allowing personal opinions to reach the other party, or even making certain recommendations. The extra-linguistic elements can be of various features, such as taking actions or reacting towards national or international events related to the forthcoming negotiation, certain attitudes as well as gestures which have, explicitly or implicitly, a correlation with the approaching negotiation or other matters. In fact, the pre-essential context of negotiation can, sometimes, be useful if it is directed in a positive and
constructive manner to "... test the water for the temperature of the other side's position without necessarily making any commitments" (Zartman and Berman, 1982: 223), or if the side who exploits it is well aware of the potential political or diplomatic consequences which will presumably follow. Otherwise, it can be very risky and problematic. The reason for this is that such a context can have a significant influence on the outcome of the actual negotiation which will follow. Any action taken, or comments given, before the actual meeting will inevitably cast light or shadow on the actual negotiation and will certainly affect the final outcome positively or negatively.

2. Data and Methods:

The data to be investigated in this research were obtained from more than one source. The bulk of the empirical data was gathered from the media (newspapers, radio and television) through which almost any diplomatic event is reported. The important thing is that, when obtaining data from the media, a researcher, with the intention of closely following a certain diplomatic event, can benefit from seeing, hearing and reading about the event from different points of view. Thus, given the opportunity that a certain occurrence happens to be reported by the various means of the media, the realization of the scientific approach of gathering empirical [...] data may be perfectly achieved. The Reykjavik Summit, for example, [...] was a crucial diplomatic event in 1986 (held on 11-12 October) in which Americans and Russians negotiated one of the most fundamental issues of world peace: namely, nuclear disarmament. This event was widely and thoroughly covered by all types of the media. Reporters who belong to every single type of the media (e.g. newspapers, radio, television) were directly and lively reporting every happening from Reykjavik (the Capital of Iceland where the Summit was held) to all parts of the world. Through the media, reporters made it possible for interested and professional people to follow the negotiation activities minute-by-minute and build a conspicuous picture of the Summit and its surrounding circumstances.

Part of the Summit's diplomatic negotiation, which would be investigated in this research, was drawn from British newspapers such as The Times, The Daily Telegraph, The Independent and The Guardian. Through BBC Radio 4, and Television news on BBC1, BBC2's Newsnight as well as ITN, the happenings and circumstances surrounding the Summit were listened to and watched and notes were taken. Another part of empirical data associated with the Reykjavik Summit was provided by a number of ambassadors (some of whom attended the Summit) through
tape-recorded interviews. This investigation of the Summit’s negotiation would benefit from all these sources of data.

The method of investigation would follow the holistic approach of sociolinguistic perspectives as has been specifically utilized by Hymes (1974) and Gumperz (1982) where socio-cultural background knowledge is viewed as revealed in the actual speech of communication activities and characterized by specific cultural values and norms that constrain both the form and the outcome of what is expressed (see Al-Mulla, 1991: 63-82; 1992: 100-109).

The investigation will concentrate on the problem of “How” socio-cultural background knowledge overlaps with linguistic knowledge, and ‘Why’ this overlapping creates misunderstanding or misinterpretation of messages and intentions, sometimes resulting, in impeding the progress of the negotiation process and leading, on some occasions, to the collapse of the negotiation process and leading, on some occasions, to the collapse of the negotiation activities.

This indicates that the primary function of the research is not to elicit ‘What’ was happening in Reykjavik Summit negotiations but rather to explain and to interpret ‘How’ and ‘Why’ the negotiation of Reykjavik Summit collapsed. That is, to give reasons and to provide answers. In other words, the method of investigation to be undertaken for the research is going to be explanatory and interpretive rather than descriptive.

3. The Pre-Essential Context of Negotiation of the Reykjavik Summit:

As far as the Preparatory-Essential Context of the diplomatic negotiation of the Reykjavik Summit is concerned, the diplomatic as well as political atmospheres before the Summit (in Iceland on 11-12 October, 1986) were not in favor of successful negotiation. This suggests strongly that the pre-essential context of the negotiation was misconducted.

On the part of the Americans (partner one) only a few days before the event the US Administration described many members of the former Soviet Union’s Mission at the United Nations as KGB intelligence officers (i.e. the Secret Police of the USSR). Partner one’s report said:
(1) Amer 'the KGB has succeeded in infiltrating its officers into the UN bureaucracy, with some reaching positions of authority...' *(The Times, October 9, 1986, P.7)*

The message conveyed by the report suggested that the members of the Soviet's Mission at the United Nations were not really diplomats as they were supposed to be: rather they were KGB officers engaged in spying activities against the US Government. The accuracy of this report is not material to this work; what is material is the kind of language used at such a critical time in the message which was floated to the Soviet Union (partner two) a few days before the Reykjavik Summit. This message had, at least, two types of meaning: Literal meaning (being represented by the propositional content of the report which denoted that KGB officers had succeeded in reaching positions of authority at the United Nations), and intended meaning (being suggested by the illocutionary acts of the message of the report which connotes that the Soviet members of the United Nations were not diplomats as they were supposed to be but rather, spies; that is, 'accusation' against the soviet Government). That indicated that partner one accused partner two of causing a great damage to its government by sending spies to the Mission at the United Nations instead of diplomats. As a consequence, partner one ordered 25 diplomats of partner two's Mission to leave the country.

On the part of the Soviet Union (partner two), there appeared to be no immediate response to partner one's move. This did not imply that partner two accepted partner one's move, the 'accusation,' but seemingly preferred not to react immediately and reserved its reaction until, or after, the event of the Reykjavik's negotiation, as we shall see later.

Another incident of floating messages prior to the Reykjavik Summit negotiation could be regarded in the following exchange of messages:

(2) Amer 'Human rights were *right up at the top of our agenda*' *(The Times, October 11, 1986, pp.5)*

(3) Sovi ... (Act: The Soviet officials confirmed that the dissident Poetess *(Irina)* was unconditionally released) *(The Times, October 11, 1986)*
(4) Amer 'We are always pleased to receive word that someone who applied has been given permission to leave. But this is only a symbol of a very broad and deep concern.' (The Times, October 11, 1986, pp. 5).

(5) Sovi 'We are prepared to look for solutions to the burning problems which concern peoples all over the world, and among them, with first priority, to take the decisions which would remove the threat of nuclear war and which would allow us to tackle thoroughly the problem of disarmament.' (The Times, October 11, 1986)

Partner one's move (message 2) appeared to state its position in an explicit message that 'human rights' would be the first priority in the negotiation at Reykjavik. Partner one repeatedly regarded human rights as extremely crucial for the negotiation with partner two. In its account, the rapport of human rights would build trust and accountability between both sides which partner one always considered as the key element for successful negotiations. However, partner one's move (message 2 above) did have another implicit speech act, a 'demand' or an 'order'. And if such a demand was taken by partner two as the 'intended message' from partner one, then this intended act would hardly be acceptable to partner two and, therefore, it might provoke an unpredictable reaction.

In diplomatic negotiation, such as the case at hand, the two partners to the negotiation belonged to two independent states. This means that both states had sovereignty and therefore they were equal partners (in the sense of having diplomatic parity) in the negotiation process. This, further, means that partner one's 'demand' or 'order' would not be acceptable to partner two because it would indicate that partner one had more power and by virtue of this power could impose instructions (or provisions) upon partner two. And if such a practice is usually rejected by other independent states, then it would be unlikely to be accepted by any of the two 'superpowers', given the history of sensitivity between them.

Furthermore, partner one's message above (message 2) could, in the 'deep indirect speech act' have a third intended meaning, that is an accusation which could be interpreted as:

'We Americans had numerous evidence, whether from inside the USSR or from Afghanistan, which allowed us to accuse you (Russians) of neglecting human rights
and repressing the dissidents, and therefore, we demanded that you refrain from such practice prior to our negotiation of more complicated matters which require much more trust and accountability. Moreover, the phrase of 'OUR agenda' in partner one's message above (message 2) appeared to imply that the American's agenda (because of the use of our, the possessive determiner or adjectives: (Halliday and Hasan, 1976: 43) was different from that of partner two. If this were the case, then it would be highly unlikely to be suitable or acceptable for a summit between two leaders of the two superpowers. The usual practice in any summit, whether between superpowers or otherwise, is that the meeting must rely on a well-prepared agenda approved by both sides prior to the meeting. Otherwise the meeting might not be carried out properly, and because of an inevitable digression and ramification of the discussion, the results could be fruitless.

Partner two's countermove was non-linguistic. At the time, it verbally ignored message 2. However, it did perform an 'act'; that is, it released some dissidents including the poetess, Irina. Such an act was a very powerful 'message' to partner one's move (message 2 above), yet it was an implicit or indirect message. It suggested partner two (The Russians) had understood and recognized partner one's move about the 'demand' of negotiating human rights in the first place at the Reykjavik Summit. Therefore, the release of the dissident poetess in itself had a number of implications which were dispatched indirectly to partner one (the Americans). Firstly, as we shall see shortly, partner two rejected partner one's 'demand' of giving human rights the first priority in the negotiation because, as partner two (the Soviets) implied by its 'act', it was observing human rights exactly like partner one and thus it did not need to receive lessons from the others. Therefore, it denied partner one's demand of considering human rights 'at the top of the agenda' of the negotiation at the Reykjavik Summit. On the other hand, since partner two was the negotiator who initiated the Reykjavik meeting (according to a soviet career diplomat--interview, see page 34 of this research), its delegate brought to Reykjavik a package of suggestions which comprised three essential elements all of which dealt with the elimination of nuclear arms and none of which dealt with human rights and therefore the main theme of the summit, in partner two's viewpoint, was nuclear disarmament. Secondly, partner two, by performing such an act, was rejecting partner one's accusation of having denied or neglected human rights. Thirdly, partner two sent a clear 'message' to partner one suggesting that one (the Americans) should forget or, at least, set aside the so-called human rights, which it uses (according to partner two) as a 'washing string' and 'by which it plays a double game.' These
implications were indirectly and implicitly conveyed by partner two to partner one along with certain intentions and desires that partner one would recognize the intended message.

It appeared that partner one, although pleased by the release of some dissidents, did not actually acknowledge partner two's act as observation of human rights. In fact it regraded what partner two had done as 'only a symbol of a very broad and deep concern' (see message 4 above), that is that partner one was looking not only for improvements in the human rights of individual cases but also in the whole area of the repression of dissidents. Moreover, the use of the conjunctive morpheme But, according to Halliday and Hasan (1976: 237, 250), is a conjunctive element which contains within itself the logical meaning of 'and', and expresses an 'adversative relation which is 'contrary to expectation' (see Al Mulla, 1982:28). Therefore, partner one's pleasure expressed earlier in the message (message 4 above) contrasts with its dissatisfaction with the same act (partner two's release of some dissidents). In other words, partner two's release of some dissidents). In other words, partner one's use of But indicated that it no longer held its pleasure; on the contrary it disapproved of the act.

As repeatedly mentioned, if the message of the counterpart did not meet the conditions of satisfaction or success in negotiation, that is, if it did not satisfy the partners' intentional states (e.g. desire, belief and intention), then the activity in progress could be affected by such circumstances. This might justify the following countermove of partner two (message 5 above):

(5) Sovi 'We are prepared to look for solutions to the burning problems which concern people all over the world and among them, with first priority, to take the decisions which would remove the threat of nuclear war and which would allow us to tackle thoroughly the problems of disarmament.' (The Times, October 11, 1986)

It appeared that each word and each phrase in partner two's message above were intentionally calculated to serve specific purposes; to 'hit back' indirectly at the earlier message of partner one. The overt content of this message represented the linguistic semantics whereas the covert content of the message suggested its intended meaning and therefore the message was a 'chain of demands' (if not warnings) of what partner two (the Soviets) wanted to achieve from the summit; and
if partner one (the Americans) did not realize or recognize such demands and', in turn, satisfy them, then the Summit could be at risk. Therefore, as partner two put it to partner one, the Reykjavik summit would 'look for solutions to the burning problems which concern peoples all over world' (see message 5 above) rather than looking (by implication) for human rights, as being demanded by partner one, which concerned only 'part of the people of the world.' In addition, the 'first priority' of such a summit would be 'to take decisions which would remove the threat of nuclear war' (according to the Soviets' message above) rather than discussing human rights which would not, by comparison, mount to cause nuclear war (as if we were saying 'if your house is burning, save it first then blame the household for the causes').

Partner two, according to the message above (message 5), considered the Reykjavik summit to be a summit of 'the decisions ' and not as a'base-camp' as being considered by partner one (The independent, October 13, 1986, pp.1). Likewise, this message involved an indirect speech act. In addition to the propositional content (the linguistic sense), the message contained intended meaning according to the sociocultural dimensions of language (i.e. pragmatics and speech acts); that is, criticism (or even accusation) that partner one (the Americans) downgraded the meeting, or did not regard the opportunity seriously. Such a reaction from partner two provided clues about its dissatisfaction or dismay which suggested that partner one's message (message 4 above) had not met partner two's (the Soviets') expectations or wishes with regard to the nature of the summit. This was the reason that led partner two to describe partner one's earlier remarks as providing 'not a little foundation' to start a meeting (The Times, October 11, 1986).

In fact, this kind of communication continued between the two partners prior to the actual negotiation event in Iceland. Consider the following move initiated by partner one:

(6) Amer the US had 'nothing in its pocket ' to put before the Russians ..

'The only in my pocket is my hotel key.' (October 11, 1986, p.1)

This message took place in the most critical moment of the event. It was made shortly before the two delegations agreed to conceal the details of the negotiation. Obviously, the overt content of the message (the literal meaning according to linguistic semantics) was not the one which was intended. Certainly, partner one did not approach the Reykjavik summit empty-handed, so to speak, with the ultimate purpose of staying in one of the most famous hotels in Reykjavik. Had this claim been incorrect, then the message above would have contradicted the earlier messages.
revealed by partner one (the Americans), especially the message of human rights which was 'at the top of its agenda' (see message 2 above).

However, even if we considered the indirect speech act of message 6 above, its indirect illocutionary force, as that partner one actually came to the Reykjavik summit with no 'specific' proposals to put before partner two (the Soviets') or no 'offer' to provide, or no 'compromise' to reach (or to accept) especially in the area of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, the so-called star wars), the covert content of the message would still be that partner one must have had 'something' in its pocket in addition to the hotel keys, such as certain agenda, proposals or, at least, certain suggestions. Otherwise, there would not be a point in attending the summit at all and the message floated would contradict, as mentioned earlier, partner one's previously revealed messages.

The key words in the above message that caused such an ambiguity was the use of the noun-substitute, 'nothing' which is composed of the two morphemes : No and Thing and means 'not any thing' (Palmer, 1959: 199). The sentence (the message), with its two contents (the overt, OVC, and the covert, CVC) could be regarded linguistically as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OVC</th>
<th>‘The U.S. had nothing in its pocket,</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(subject) (verb) (prepositional phrase)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVC</td>
<td>‘The Americans possessed not anything with them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Benefactive) (verb) (locative)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(see Fillmore, 1968, 1977; Chafe, 1970)

Thus the 'message' (the sentence) could be read as that 'partner one possessed not anything in its pocket.' This would exclude every possibility that we suggested earlier in accordance with partner one's explicit position with regard to human rights, among other things on its agenda. The message then because of its ambiguous nature, could be interpreted by partner two (the Soviets as that partner one would attend the negotiation at Reykjavik with an intention of not becoming a 'full active partner, who would participate in every aspect of the negotiation in order to reach a sort of agreement or compromise, but rather it would attend the summit to 'receive proposals from partner two and discover 'new directions' which could 'give impulse' to negotiators for a new round in Geneva. In addition, the phrases underlined above, which were revealed by a member of partner one's delegation,
might intensify speculations about the real intention of partner one in attending the summit (The Times, October 11, 1986, pp.5).

The situation, then, was ambiguous. On the one hand, partner one attended the Reykjavik summit with the determination to negotiate human rights, and on the other hand, it approached Reykjavik with 'nothing' in its pocket, hand or mind related to or associated with the Reykjavik summit's negotiation. This indicated that partner on attended the summit to 'receive something' but to 'offer nothing.'

This was the political and diplomatic atmosphere before the actual event of the Reykjavik negotiation. The 'Preparatory- Essential Context,' as we noticed, was full of indirect speech acts. The messages expressed as well as the actions taken were performed to serve specific intentional purposes and desires which were intended and directed by each party. Given that the two parties belonged to different cultures, political stances and ideologies, the mutual understanding between them would be dependent upon the recognition of the covert content of the messages performed (the indirect speech acts) and, in turn, the fulfillment of the intended acts. Any misunderstanding of the messages and misinterpretation or mismanagement of the intended acts would certainly result, as we shall see, in dissatisfaction which would significantly influence the next stage of the negotiation.

4. The actual negotiation of the Reykjavik summit:

When the actual diplomatic negotiation started in Iceland (on saturday, October 11, 1986), the two leaders (president Reagan, partner one, and Mr. Gorbachev, partner two) met on their own for slightly more than an hour. In this first session, partner one disclosed its views on linking the Strategic Defense Initiative (the SDI, the so-called Star Wars) with phased elimination of ballistic missiles. Partner two, however, instead of complaining against the SDI as usual, startled partner one by reverting to a proposal to cut strategic nuclear weapons by 50 percent during the next five years, and eliminate them altogether over 10 years.

On Sunday, October 12, the two partners extended their meeting. The dominant theme of this extended session revolved around the interpretation of the ABM treaty (Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty). The discussion concentrated on one phrase of this treaty, 'Laboratory-testing.' Partner two's (the Soviets') interpretation of this phrase was that the treaty would not permit any experiment of space weapons outside the laboratory, the so-called 'narrow interpretation of the ABM treaty.' Contrariwise, partner one (the Americans) opted for the 'wide' interpretation which claimed that
full-scale development and testing of space weapons would be legally permissible. After about four hours of sharp confrontation, the two partners failed to reach a solution and therefore they surrendered. Partner one admitted that it was tired and had no ability and desire to continue 'fighting about one word -- laboratory-testing.' As a result, partner one told partner two (the Soviets):

(7) Amer 'I am disappointed that from the very beginning you had come to Reykjavik with no willingness to reach agreement!' (The Guardian!'
(October 14, 1986, pp.6)

Partner one's move above reflected the outcome of the actual diplomatic negotiation between the two partners and indicated a number of crucial points that led to such an outcome. It would be helpful to trace the reasons behind partner one's disappointment (that is, 'how' and 'why' it happened).

In the first session of the negotiation between the two partners, partner one (the Americans) formulated its views on the link of the SDI with a phased elimination of ballistic missiles. However, partner two (the Soviets), instead of complaining against the SDI, startled partner one by reverting to a proposal to cut strategic nuclear weapons by 50 percent during the next five years, and eliminate them altogether over ten years. In such a practice, it was widely believed that there were two different patterns of negotiation involved, each of which reflected the cultural behavior of the negotiator. Partner one, since it belonged to the American culture, used the 'formula-pattern,' or the deductive approach, to negotiation. That is, partner one, at the beginning of the negotiation, attempted to formulate its views and left the details to follow as the negotiation progressed. It provided its agreement, in principle, to what it believed to be the essential issues and left the details to come later in the process of the negotiation. Partner two, on the other hand, since it was a member of the Russian culture, employed 'the detail-pattern, or the 'inductive approach' to negotiation. That is, it preferred, from the beginning, to work on a detailed level, starting high and progressing until reaching concessions (see Zartman and Berman, 1982: 224-9).

With this information at hand, partner one, after having formulated its views about the essential issues of the meeting, expected its counterpart to do the same in order to find a mutual ground on which the negotiation would proceed. However,
partner two did not satisfy partner one's expectation since, in its own way, it went on to introduce its first proposal.

Partner two (the Russians), since it was the initiator of the summit (according to a Russian career diplomat -- interview), brought to Reykjavik a package of suggestions comprising three essential elements (i.e. proposals), all of which dealt with the elimination of nuclear weapons. According to the Russian's negotiation pattern, mentioned earlier, partner two certainly would proceed to introduce and discuss the three proposals of its package. This practice actually surprised partner one which therefore, spoke of 'unexpected proposals'. In order to negotiate the 'unexpected proposals' (from partner one's, the Americans' view, of course), the two parties needed more time, and therefore, they extended on Sunday, October 12 for more than four hours. The major theme negotiated in the extended session was the third essential element (proposal) of the Russians' package, namely the compromise-deal on the armaments of outer space (i.e. the SDI, Star Wars). At this stage, several crucial points emerged as the negotiation of the SDI continued.

First, it appeared that partner one (the Americans) misinterpreted partner two's intention with regard to the strategic Defense Initiative. That is, since partner two (the Russians) did not complain about the SDI in the first session of the negotiation, partner one must have thought that partner two had been less strident about the SDI and thereby the issue could be unrevealed, at least until the next full-scale Summit in the United States (as previously agreed by the next full-scale Summit in the United States (as previously agreed by the two leaders). However, after it appeared that partner two persisted on negotiating the SDI (since this element was one part of its package), partner one appeared to have felt that it had miscalculated partner one appeared to have felt that it had miscalculated partner two's resistance to SDI. This situation led to a great deal of misunderstanding.

Secondly, the disagreement between the two partners on the interpretation of the phrase 'Laboratory-testing' (whether or not the SDI's test and development be permitted outside the laboratory) impeded the progress of the negotiation. This, in turn, resulted in partner one's 'disappointment', which was very explicit from its message (message 7 above). This indicated that the negotiation actually collapsed.

Thirdly, in addition to the cultural behavior of negotiation, mentioned above, another crucial factor might be involved which led partner two (the Soviets) to make in the first session of the negotiation, its first proposal (i.e. the elimination of all
nuclear arms) instead of formulating its views as did partner one. That factor was the 'effect' of the per-essential context (discussed in the first section of this paper) on partner two. The indication of this is that, unlike partner one who regarded the meeting as 'a base-camp', partner two considered it as a 'decision-making summit'. This consideration, in addition to the diversity of the two partners' views on the priority of the Summit's major theme (i.e. human rights vs. nuclear arms elimination), led partner two to introduce the first proposal, referred to earlier, as an indication of the seriousness as well as a signal for what partner two (the Soviets) considered to be the main theme of the Summit. It this were a valid interpretation, then partner two, by what it performed, must have been 'disappointed' by the outcome of the 'Preparatory-Essential Context' of the negotiation.

This kind of outcome led the two partners to mutual accusations. Each partner thought that the counterpart was responsible for the unfavorable outcome. It was clear from the message above (message 7) that partner one (the Americans) explicitly accused partner two of having 'no willingness to reach an agreement.' The covert content of this message, according to the sociocultural dimensions of language, suggested that partner one accused partner two of being responsible for the undesired outcome which was reached; that is, the failure of reaching an agreement.

The counter accusation emerged from the countermove of partner two:

(8) Sovi 'They wanted me to assent to aburial ceremony for ABM treaty
(The Guardian, October 14, 1986, pp.6)

Such a message suggested two different meanings; overt and covert, or literal and intended. The overt meaning of the message was denoted by its linguistic semantics which read, 'Partner one attempted to obtain partner two's approval to bury the ABM treaty,' whereas the covert meaning (which was connoted by the message's illocutionary force) conveyed a counter accusation to partner one. That is, partner one, on its persistence in developing and testing the SDI in outer space, not only prevented the summit from reaching an agreement, but also 'Killed the ABM treaty itself.'

The accusation and the counter accusation proved that the summit's outcome dismayed and disappointed both partners, and indicated that this outcome did not meet with their satisfaction. This demonstrated that both partners attended the summit with the intention of reaching an agreement, as this research assumed earlier (page
1). As a result, unlike partner two (the Soviets) whose intention was clear from the very beginning, partner one (the Americans), although it concealed its real intention (as we saw from the discussion earlier), attended the summit for the same goal as that of partner two; that is, to reach an agreement (whatever that agreement might be).

However, the concealment of partner one's real intention under various configurations, as mentioned in the previous section of this paper, contributed heavily to the summit's final outcome. Consider the following exchange:

(9) Amer 'In the end we are deeply disappointed with the outcome.' (the Independent, October 13, 1986, pp.1)

(10) Sovi 'This has been a failure, and failure where we were very close to an historic agreement. All of the arms race might begin with unpredictable military and political consequences.' (The Daily Telegraph, October 13, pp.1)

In the exchanges above, the two partners openly and explicitly confirmed the sad and the 'unexpected' outcome they reached, and, therefore, they expressed the deep sorrow and regret over the final result, the collapse of the diplomatic negotiation. The obvious indication of such a feeling is that neither of the two partners expected such a result. They approached Reykjavik to fulfill one supreme principle; that was to find a 'solution to the burning problems which concern peoples all over the world, and to take decisions which would remove the threat of nuclear war.'

However, the efforts fell short of the high expectations. And, as a consequence, the intended acts went unfulfilled, and the intentions and desires passed unsatisfied and therefore certain significant implications would follow.

The outcome of Reykjavik's diplomatic negotiation was, as we noticed, severe and heavy on both partners of the negotiation activity and therefore it produced significant influences:

The first influence of the collapse of the Reykjavik summit's negotiation was clear from partner two's message above, 'All of the arms race might begin with unpredictable military and political consequences.' The overt content of this message expressed a possibility; that is, because of the use of the modal auxiliary verb
'might' (= it is possible to ...), the literal meaning of the message would be 'it is possible that the arms race begin...' However, taking into account all the circumstances in which such a message was expressed, the message could convey another meaning, the intended meaning according to the speaker's intention which associated with his 'socio-politico-cultural background.' In this circumstance, partner two performed an illocutionary force (an indirect speech act) that is, 'warning.' Thus, partner two (the Soviets), because of the failure of the summit's negotiation, 'warned' partner one that 'All of the arms race would be permitted now to begin...' The modal auxiliary verb 'may/might,' according to this interpretation, could have another meaning which was permission (see Lecch, 1971: 67).

The second influence of the collapse of the Reykjavik summit's negotiation was that the failure of reaching an agreement between the two partners broadened and deepened their mutual suspicion and destruct. Such an influence was obvious from the following exchange:

(11) Amer 'Late this afternoon I made a new proposal to the General Secretary, a ten-year delay in deployment of SDI in exchange for the elimination of all ballistic missiles. The General Secretary agreed, only if I would sign an agreement that would deny to me and future presidents, for ten years, the right to test and develop the best defense against nuclear missiles. This we could not and will not do.' (The Daily Telegraph, October 13, 1986)

(12) Sovi 'How can we proceed with our talk of abolishing nuclear weapons if the US continues by testing to try and perfect them? How can there be a threat to the United States, if we are keeping our promise to scrap our nuclear weapons? This means that their SDI is of an offensive military character, aimed at achieving nuclear superiority!' (The Guardian, October 15, 1986, pp.6).

The problem of mistrust, as mentioned earlier, revolved around the ABM treaty's phrase 'laboratory-testing' with its two different interpretations. Partner two's (the Soviets') interpretation was that the SDI's testing would only be permitted inside the laboratory (according to the American officials who drafted and negotiated the treaty, The Guardian, October 14, 1986, pp.6), whereas partner one's (the Americans') interpretation was that the SDI's testing and development would be
legally permissible in 'out space' (i.e. outside the laboratory). Given these two positions with regard to the ABM treaty, partner two preferred to sign an agreement for 'a binding undertaking' to maintain the 1972 ABM treaty for ten years. This request was rejected by partner one. In this very position, partner two performed two indirect speech acts; a request and a promise. This indicated that partner two, when it performed such acts, had a desire as well as an intention; a desire for recognizing its request and then implementing its intended act (i.e. to sign an agreement), and an intention to keep its word (i.e. the promise). If these two acts passed unfulfilled, then partner two (the Soviets) would be psychologically unsatisfied. However, in order for these two acts to be fulfilled they must be performed in a normal situation and usual circumstance, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the counterpart, for whom the request and the promise were performed, must, in addition to being heard and understood, take them seriously (Austin, 1962). In the case at hand, it appeared that partner one (the Americans) had no trust in partner two. This was implied from partner one's description of the SDI as '... the best defence against nuclear missiles' (e.g. the Russian ballistic missiles, see message 11 above). Therefore, partner two's request and promise passed unacknowledged by its counterpart, and as a consequence, unfulfilled. This action would certainly dismay partner two and, as a result, would invite (or attract) its reaction (message 12 above):

(13) sovi '... How can there be a threat to the United States, if we are keeping our promise to scrap our nuclear weapons. This means that their SDI is of an offensive military character, aimed at achieving nuclear superiority.'

This response reflected the psychological state of partner two as its intended acts passed unrecognized and unfulfilled. The promise it intended to keep (following the saying 'our word is our bond'), was not recognized by partner one as being a promise, and therefore its intentional state passed unsatisfied (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1983). This is why partner two developed suspicions of partner one's SDI.

The third influence resulting from the collapse of the Reykjavik Summit's negotiation was the suspension of the Summit (to be held in Washington upon which the two partners had previously agreed). This was clear from the following exchange (which needs no further explanation):

(14) AMer 'I think you didn't want a Summit!'
(15) Sovi 'Well, there is still time.'
(16) AMer 'No, there isn't.' (The Guardian, October 15, 1986, pp.6).
The fourth influence, that had far-reaching implications for the two partners' relations at an intensely sensitive time in arms control negotiations following the collapse of the Reykjavik Summit, was the retaliatory expulsion pattern of diplomats (the so-called tit-for-tat diplomatic expulsion). Exactly a week after the breakdown of the Reykjavik Summit over the SDI issue partner two expelled five American diplomats. The act was seen as a direct retaliation by Moscow for an earlier decision by partner one to expel 25 members of the Soviet Mission at the United Nations (mentioned and discussed in the first section of this research, the pre-essential context negotiation). Tass, the official Soviet news agency, reported:

(17) Sovi' 'The attention of the Us Embassy was 'again' drawn to facts of the continuing use of American diplomatic missions in the USSR for illegal activities against the Soviet Union, and the demand was made that appropriate measures be taken for stopping them.' (The Times, October 20, 1986, pp.1, 24)

Following this, partner one ordered 55 Soviet diplomats to leave the country. The State Department of partner one (the Americans) accused all of the 55 of 'activities inconsistent with their diplomatic status,' the standard euphemism for spying (The Times, October 22, 1986, pp.1).

Certainly there were fundamental differences between the two partners. Differences in ideological matters, in political, economic and military roles as well as in national interests, wishes and values. However, these differences were perpetual between them before the meeting at Reykjavik in Iceland, and would remain so forever without them causing a damage like that of the Reykjavik Summit negotiation. In fact, including the two partners, no one expected such a sad result which was followed by an unfortunate effect which imposed itself on the activity of the two partners who had gone to Iceland, in the first place, to minimize their differences, to better understand each other and, as was the goal and intention of both partners, to reach a certain agreement on nuclear disarmament.

However, instead of blaming the two partners for such a sad outcome which affected not only the relationship between the two superpowers but also influenced the entire world, there were a number of factors which can be blamed for causing such an outcome. From the viewpoint of International Linguistic Communication, ILC (Al Mulla, 1986), Sketched in Al Mulla (1991), the diversity of the two
partners' sociocultural backgrounds was the main reason for what happened. The investigation of the language of the Rykjavik negotiation, the pre-essential context of negotiation as well as the actual context of negotiation, indicated that the different approaches of negotiation between the two partners, the diversity of their views on the nature of the summit, the different interpretation of the linguistic phrase 'laboratory-testing,' and, above all else, the lack of mutual recognition and judgment of the intended messages and acts were behind the unsuccessful negotiation of the Reykjavik Summit. These factors reduced the chances for successful negotiation and created a context of misunderstanding, misinterpretation and misjudgment which eventuated the collapse of the diplomatic negotiation and what followed.

5. Evaluation of the outcome of the Reykjavik Summit

The outcome of the Reykjavik Summit negotiation underwent evaluation by career diplomats (ambassadors). As part of the field work of this study, the career diplomats were asked to evaluate the diplomatic negotiation of the Reykjavik Summit and its results. The question which was delivered to the career diplomats was, 'Mr. Ambassador, do you have a word to say about the Reykjavik Summit: its negotiation and outcome?'

The responses, which were provided by the career diplomats and tape-recorded, concentrate, in general, on one area; that is, the Reykjavik Summit's negotiation was a mixture of misunderstanding, miscommunication and misconduct of negotiation, and the outcome was a product of these elements.

According to an Indian career diplomat, the great opportunity which could reduce the tensions in this world was lost. His views on the outcome were as follows:

'All I can say is that a great opportunity was missed which could have reduced tensions in this world and which would have been a step, however small, in the direction of making this a safer world. ... so, I would say that to me, it seems, because I cannot find any other explanation, there was a lack of communication which resulted ... in this, as I said, an opportunity which missed, ...' (Ishrat Aziz, an Indian Ambassador -- interview)

In the view of an Austrian career diplomat, it is only dangerous to raise expectations too high for the general public when a summit takes place and afterwards, if the result is not as high as the expectations raised, then it will become
problematic, and thus 'the general public was a little bit puzzled and sought about what was happened at Reykjavik: [sic]

'Yes, in a sense you might say it was misunderstanding, but I wonder whether so much in the language or in the different cultures, but just in the unexpected proposal from one side on the other. Certainly this is due to cultural differences, but then there were different techniques of negotiation, and I wonder that those techniques were built on the cultural background, or if they were not ... It can be said that it is connected with the cultural background of the person concerned, but I think there was a lot of individuality in the negotiation.' (an Austrian career diplomat--interview) The diplomatic communication of the Reykjavik Summit, according to a British career diplomat, was extremely confusing. His response to the earlier question was as follows:

'Well, to tell the truth, I found the Reykjavik Summit extremely confusing myself, and I was not sure at the end of the day exactly who was standing where, and there were a lot of redefinitions of what the President had meant. ... But I think what is bad about that sort of exchange is that it undermines trust, and if two leaders are involved in a situation in which neither trust the other an inch, and then after each meeting, because of misunderstanding in communication or maybe misunderstanding in briefing, but anyway, whatever the misunderstanding is ..., I think it is the process of diplomacy that is serious because it means that the basis of trust for the future has been eroded ...' (Michael Tait, a British Ambassador -- interview) The problem of mistrust between the two partners was repeated by an Italian career diplomat. He argued that people would be naive enough if they demanded too much from the two partners with their fundamental differences in the way of life and in their visions of the world and the roles they are supposed to play. 'Whether the Reykjavik Summit's outcome was a failure, or a complete failure, this would be left for history to decide.' He stressed several points as follows:

'... Each one accuses the other ... you know it is difficult to say a thing ... To men like President Reagan and First Secretary Gorbachev, they cannot meet to discuss, they meet to sign. ... Yes, knowing each other is good but pretending on the knowledge that they can demilitarize and ... and so removing all the problems, it would be naive ... it is out of reality ... it is a dream and not politics ...' (an Italian career diplomat -- interview)
However, this is not meant to exhaust all the possibilities of the data. The intention is to represent some examples of the career diplomats' views on the outcome of the Reykjavik Summit. In fact, almost all the career diplomats who were interviewed (25 ambassadors agreed to be tape-recorded) shared the same or similar views as those presented above. However, it would perhaps be appropriate to consider some views from American and Russian career diplomats since they were representing the two countries involved in the negotiation at Reykjavik.

An American career diplomat provided a general view in an obvious attempt to avoid commenting on the Reykjavik Summit specifically. However, such views were clear indicators of the effect of diplomatic communication on the outcome of the Reykjavik Summit. And since the response was given on the occasion of the Summit negotiation, then part of this response, at least, would reflect the career diplomat's views on the negotiation activity of the Reykjavik Summit:

"Well I think that sometimes before I get to the Iceland Summit, and I am not sure that I will want to comment on that specifically, sometimes interests are in fact contrary and intractable. ... But I agree that very, very often, perhaps in a great majority of the cases, either sides or at least one side fails to understand where the areas of accommodation are possible. I think it is a common human belief that one side's gain is the other side's loss. I think this is a primitive notion that all of us grow up with. ..." (an American career diplomat -- interview)

On the other hand, a Russian career diplomat, instead of commenting on the outcome of the diplomatic communication of the Reykjavik Summit, attempted to provide the direct cause, from the Soviet's point of view, of course, of the failure of the negotiation between the two countries. The response he provided was as follows:

"The answer is clear, the answer is very clear. The Soviet Union was a negotiator initiating this summit meeting, and --- [therefore] Gorbachev brought to Reykjavik a package of suggestions which compromised three essential elements. The consent of the Soviet Union was to bring about the elimination of all nuclear arms by the end of the century. ... But there was a third essential element of this package, a compromise-deal, that is the prevention of the armaments getting into outer-space. It is a vital thing to stop the armament race in space because if we limit or destroy nuclear arsenals on Earth and bring the same nuclear armament into space, there is no logicalness to start a new round of the arms race into space while destroying
rockets and nuclear armaments on Earth. ..., and our attitude is that Americans must abandon their conception of 'Star wars' and they must accept our conception of 'Star-Peace.' ... The absence of an agreement on the third point was a stumbling block preventing positive results of this Summit in Iceland.' (a Russian career diplomat -- interview)

Those were the views of the career diplomats on the outcome of the negotiation of the Reykjavik Summit. The intention, as mentioned earlier, was to present some views of the professional diplomats who dedicated their entire lives to the service of international relations on a bilateral as well as a multi-lateral basis. These views were derived from long experience in the field of diplomacy, diplomatic negotiation. Having acknowledged their experiences, the evaluations which they provided, were meant, in general, to corroborate and support the investigation of the language of the Reykjavik Summit negotiation, and to establish the assumption that the undesired outcome and the unfortunate effects of the Summit's negotiation were, to a large extent, a matter of the misconduct and mismanagement of the 'Preparatory-Essential Context' of negotiation which, in turn, influenced the actual negotiation of the summit and led to the final outcome. The unawareness, or unrecognition of the counterpart's intended messages and acts, and the unimplementation of those acts resulted in the dissatisfaction of the intentional states of the counterpart. These, in turn, generated psychological factors which crept into the negotiation activity and eventuated the damage that neither one expected.

6. A Peaceful Strategy for Successful Negotiations:

In order to free diplomatic negotiation from such difficulties, a shared strategy between both parties of negotiation is very crucial to avoid inconvenient outcomes. Therefore, the strategy which will be proposed here, consists of the following for principles (of Grice's Cooperative principle, 'Make your contributions as is required' and its four maxims of Quantity, Quality, Relation and Manner, 1975: Al Mulla, 1986: 144, 1991: 170):

1. The Principle of Formula (or the principle of a unified method of negotiation)
2. The Principle of Straightforwardness
3. The Principle of Trust and Accountability, and
4. The Principle of Compromise
6.1 The Principle of Formula (or a unified method of negotiation)

This principle requires each party of the negotiation activity to 'formulate what it wishes to achieve clearly, accurately and positively as early as the first session of negotiation.' This means that at the very beginning of the first session of negotiation, each party needs to explicitly formulate (or outline) the main points to be discussed and detailed later with the other party. In other words, at the very start of the negotiation process, the key issues to be negotiated should be expressed in a very brief, clear and precise manner despite the prepared agenda (if there is one) in order that each party clearly understands the other side's goals, desires and intentions. The need for the principle of formula, which is the first step in the four-step strategy, comes from the fact that peoples of different cultures approach a negotiation situation with different views and negotiate with different methods and approaches as demonstrated in the negotiation of the Reykjavik Summit, where partner one (the Americans) negotiated deductively while partner two (the Soviets) negotiated inductively, the formula approach versus the detail negotiation approach (see Al Mulla, 1988: 289). Such different approaches to negotiation caused mutual uncertainty of the real intentions which eventuated disappointment for both partners. The problem which arose between the two partners was not attributed to the type of approach used by each party but rather to the different approaches used in the same negotiation. If any of these approaches had been shared by the two parties, the negotiation activity might not have collapsed. However, the formula approach seems to better suit diplomatic negotiation as it, from the very start, provides each party of the negotiation with a clear idea about the other party's goals and intentions. Such prior information is very crucial to both parties in order that each one of them can modify its position to harmonize with the real needs of the situation (this matter will be further elaborated in dealing with the fourth principle).

6.2 The Principle of Straightforwardness

This principle requires each party to 'avoid being evasive or convoluted.' This means that, from the beginning of the negotiation onward, partners should be frank, forthright and decisive. Such gestures, from both sides, are capable of stimulating a confidential atmosphere which encourages both parties to cope with the influence of the diversity of their sociocultural backgrounds.
6.3 The Principle of trust and Accountability

This principle requires the two parties of negotiation to 'achieve mutual care and reliance.' This means that each side in the negotiation should exhibit serious attention and real concern to what the other side is trying to convey in order to gain its trust and confidence. This implies that each party should carefully listen to the other party, endeavor to understand its objectives, facilitate its positions and sincerely work to remove any obstacles from hindering the achievements. Such gestures will undoubtedly be highly regarded by the other party which will then reciprocate with the same gestures. Mutual reciprocity is indispensable to any successful negotiation since its achievement would benefit both parties.

Fortunately, the old structure of the world has come to an end, and a new structure has emerged; the era of the Cold War which divided the world to North and South has hopefully ended, and a new era of trust, commitment and cooperation has started. President Bush, after his meeting (on Saturday, February 1, 1992) with President Yeltsin, described the Post-Cold War era as 'the dawn of a new era in which the United States and Russia strated a new relationship ... based on trust, based on a commitment to economic and political freedom ... to turn former enemies not only into friends but allies ...' (The Washington Post, February 2, 1992, p.1). A similar message was repeated in Paris. Following the signing ceremony of a treaty between France and Russia (on February 7, 1992), Yeltsin said, 'We are no longer enemies, or even potential adversaries. ... We want to become allies.' French President Mitterrand replied, 'Russia and France are friends and now say so.' (The Washington Post, February 7, 1992, pp.A14).

Therefore, diplomats and negotiators, in general, must realize this change and act in accordance with the elements of the new era.

6.4 The Principle of Compromise

This principle requires the two parties of negotiation to 'settle any dispute by mutual concession.' This is the superprinciple for any successful negotiation. Unless the diplomatic negotiation involved fundamental objectives such as seeking freedom, retrieving occupied territory of recovering dignity, the principle of compromise has to be present in the mind of both parties which involved themselves in the negotiating activity.
As it is a shared activity between independent states, or between their respective representatives, diplomatic communication or negotiation should produce reciprocal or compensatory outcomes which benefit all parties involved. The reason for this is that according to common practice, there would not be a party which would attend the meeting unless it finds it beneficial and rewarding. Therefore, it is unattainable for one side of the negotiation activity to obtain everything while the other side loses everything. In other words, the dichotomy of total winning and total losing does not exist in diplomatic negotiation. Both sides lose and gain by virtue of the 'give and take' procedure of diplomatic negotiation (see Al Mulla, 1988: 293; 1992: 329). That is each side should relinquish some of what it considers as its right in order for both sides to reach reasonable-amicable solutions.

Furthermore, both sides should understand that the authorized instructions they have already acquired cannot totally 'survive' in the actual context of negotiation where different views as well as various and conflicting proposals would interfere with the situational, social and cultural factors which would, in turn, produce new ideas, proposals and positions. Therefore, in virtue of the new circumstances, flexibility, tolerance and modifications in the already acquired instructions have to be considered by both parties in order to arrive at a position which would be acceptable to both parties (see Ikle, 1964; Zartman and Berman, 1982).

Having seriously considered these four principles, diplomats and negotiators ought to observe them together and satisfy their conditions in order to overcome their differences and to reach agreeable resolutions which benefit both parties.

7. Conclusion
This paper investigated the language of negotiation of the Reykjavik Summit (held in Iceland on October 11-12, 1986). The central argument was that diplomatic communication or negotiation does not emerge from a vacuum. There are always crucial elements (linguistic and non-linguistic) which precede any negotiating activity (or event). These elements, which I have termed 'the Preparatory-Essential Context' of negotiation, can have a significant negative influence on the following actual negotiation if they are misconducted and mismanaged.

As the analysis of the Pre-essential Context of the Reykjavik Summit's negotiation has revealed, the diplomatic as well as political atmospheres were not in favor of successful negotiation; the mutual misinterpretation of each partner's
messages and mutual unrecognition of each other party's intentions 'ambiguated' the
negotiating situation, intensified the social and cultural differences between the two
partners and generated a great deal of misunderstanding.

This situation extended its influence to the actual negotiation activity and led to
mutual accusations between the two partners; each partner accused the counterpart of
having no willingness to reach an agreement. The accusation and the
counteraccusation disappointed both partners and eventuated the collapse of the
summit's negotiation. This unexpected result generated far-reaching and unfortunate
consequences, an intense expulsion of diplomats from both sides (the so-called tit-
for-tat diplomatic expulsion).

In order to prevent such an undesirable outcome as well as unpleasant
consequences this research suggested a four-principled strategy for peaceful and
successful negotiation. This strategy includes the principle of straightforwardness to
secure a sincere negotiation, the principle of trust and accountability to ensure a
mutual reciprocity between the two parties of negotiation and the principle of
compromise to help both parties to peacefully reach a reasonable position.

1. Newspapers and Newsagencies

The Daily Telegraph (a British newspaper) October, 1986
The Guardian (a British newspaper) October, 1986
The Independent (a British newspaper) October, 1986
Tass (the Soviets' official newsagency) October, 1986
The Times (a British newspaper) October, 1986
The Washington Post (an American Newspaper) February, 1992
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